Curiosity and Mental Search

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

3-1-2026

Publication Source

Episteme

Volume Number

23

Issue Number

1

First Page

251

Last Page

268

ISSN

17423600

E-ISSN

17500117

Abstract

Some philosophers have recently argued that one should not be curious about a question whose answer one knows. This norm is said to follow from the fact that curiosity aims at knowledge. This article contends that the view that curiosity is inappropriate when directed at what is known, though attractive, is false. In fact, we are frequently curious about questions whose answers we know, and this curiosity is entirely appropriate because, along with metacognitive judgments about the contents of memory, it plays an important role in the process by which we successfully retrieve knowledge from memory. If this argument is successful, it reveals that some curiosity-driven inquiries target knowledge that lies within one's own mind and raises important questions about the status and interpretation of the claim that curiosity aims at knowledge.

Keywords

aims, curiosity, feeling of knowing, inquiry, Knowledge Norm, metacognition

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