Intuitionist Anti-Skepticism, Evidence, and Disagreement

Document Type

Conference Proceeding

Publication Date

10-1-2024

Publication Source

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volume Number

54

Issue Number

7

First Page

513

Last Page

521

ISSN

00455091

E-ISSN

19110820

Abstract

This article raises some questions about the intuitionist response to skepticism developed by Michael Bergmann in Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, with a focus on Bergmann’s contention that epistemic intuitions serve as justifying evidence in support of anti-skepticism. It raises three main concerns: that an intuitionist conception of evidence is overly narrow, that it has undesirable implications for cases of disagreement, and that the evidential role that epistemic intuitions play in Bergmann’s version of antiskepticism undercuts his claim that an intuitionist particularist response to skepticism is superior to disjunctivist responses.

Keywords

disagreement, epistemic intuitions, evidence, intuitions, seemings, skepticism

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