Philosophical Agreement and Philosophical Progress

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-1-2025

Publication Source

Episteme

Volume Number

22

Issue Number

2

First Page

406

Last Page

424

ISSN

17423600

E-ISSN

17500117

Abstract

In the literature on philosophical progress it is often assumed that agreement is a necessary condition for progress. This assumption is sensible only if agreement is a reliable sign of the truth, since agreement on false answers to philosophical questions would not constitute progress. This paper asks whether agreement among philosophers is (or would be) likely to be a reliable sign of truth. Insights from social choice theory are used to identify the conditions under which agreement among philosophers would be a reliable indicator of the truth, and it is argued that we lack good reason to think that philosophical inquiry meets these conditions. The upshot is that philosophical agreement is epistemically uninformative: agreement on the answer to a philosophical question does not supply even a prima facie reason to think that the agreed-upon view is true. However, the epistemic uninformativeness of philosophical agreement is not an indictment of philosophy's progress, because philosophy is valuable independent of its ability to generate agreement on the correct answers to philosophical questions.

Keywords

Agreement, disagreement, metaphilosophy, myside bias, progress, social choice theory

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